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THE EVOLUTION OF THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROCEDURE
An Essay Commemorating the Centennial Anniversary of
Keating's Act
JOHN A. BAuMANt
I.
Delay in the disposition of litigation has been one of the enduring
problems of the law. In the first English law book ever written for lay-
men, an explanation was sought for the "huge delays" that "withhold
petitioners from their right" and impose "an intolerable burden of ex-
pense."' Notwithstanding extensive reforms in judicial administration,
the law's delay remains a much mooted question today.' As one step
toward the solution of this recurrent problem, Parliament, a century ago,
enacted Keating's Act providing a summary judgment procedure to facili-
tate the collection of bills of exchange.' The appearance of a summary
judgment procedure in England in 1855 was not fortuitous; its enact-
ment was the response to economic and social pressures that could be
withstood no longer. These pressures came not from the legal profession,
which was notoriously reluctant to make any changes in the existing
system,' but from laymen and in particular the newly ascendant mercan-
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of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of the Science of Law, in the Faculty of
Law, Columbia University.
1. Fortescue, De Laudibus Legion Anglie, c. LII (c. 1470), reprinted in CHRIMES,
SIR JOHN FORT~sCUE 131 (1942).
2. See, for example, VANDERBILT, THE CHALLENGE OF LAw REFORM, c. IV (1955);
Shafroth, The Federal Courts Need More Judges, 37 J. Am. JUD. Soc'Y 10 (1953);
Report of the Temporary Commission on the Courts (New York) 23 (1955). Statistics
on the extent of this problem are collected in the Annual Report of the Director of the
Administrative Office of the U. S. Courts 95-100 (1954) and Calendar Status Study,
State Trial Courts' of General Administration, Institute of Judicial- Administration
(1955).
3. Summary Procedure on Bills of Exchange Act, 1855, 18 & 19 VICT., c. 67 (1855).
4. Dillon, Bentham's Influence in the Reforms of the Nineteenth Century, in 1
SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HIsTORy 492 (1907); Bowen, Progress
in the Administratiot of Justice During the Victorian Period, in 1 SELECT ESSAYS IN
ANGLo-AmRICAN LEGAL HISToRY 516, 519 (1907). Lord Eldon's resistance to reform is re-
counted in 10 CAMPBELL, LIvEs OF THE LoRD CHANCELLORS 265-69 (5th ed. 1868). Of
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
tile group that found the delays and technicalities of common law pro-
cedure unendurable.5
Why the dissatisfaction of the merchants resulted in the enactment
of a summary procedure at this particular time may best be understood
from a historical perspective. For centuries merchants had little reason
to resort to the common law courts for commercial litigation. Commerce
was carried on at the borough fairs held pursuant to the King's franchise,
and that franchise included the right to hold a fair or piepowder court.'
Other towns were authorized to conduct the staple trade, and these towns
were privileged to hold courts to settle disputes by the law merchant "as
to all things touching the staple." 7 A summary procedure was the note-
worthy feature of these courts.8 "Justice was administered as speedily
as the dust could fall or be removed from the feet of the litigants .... "'
In addition to the assurance of quick settlement of disputes by expedi-
tious court procedure, merchants received further aid from the system
for enrolling recognizances of debts, established by the Statute of Acton
Burnell (1283)," the Statute of Merchants (1285)," and later by the
Ordinance of the Staple (1353).12 When a debtor defaulted on such
obligations, his creditor was authorized to proceed by execution and levy
on certain lands and chattels of his debtor without first instituting court
course some members of the bar played a prominent and effective part in securing the
reform of procedure. See Holdsworth, The Movement for Reforms in the Law (1793-
1832), 56 L. Q. REv. 208 (1940).
5. Sunderland, The English Struggle for Procedural Reform, 39 HARv. L. REV. 725
(1926). See DAY, COMMON LAW PROCEDURE ACTS 11 (4th ed. 1872); 53 LAW MAG. OR
Q. REv. 77, 79 (1855).
6. 23 SELDEN SOCIETY, in 1 SELECT CASES ON THE LAW MERCHANT vi-xxvi (Gross
ed. 1908). Some boroughs had courts even when fairs were not being held. Id. at xx.
For a discussion of the medieval fairs, see BEWES, THE ROMANCE OF THE LAW MERCHANT
93 (1923).
7. 23 SELDEN SOCIETY, supra note 6, at xxvii. See COKE, FOURTH INSTITUTE *237;
Ward, The Early History of the Merchants Staplers, 33 ENa. HIST. REv. 297, 301 (1918) ;
Brodhurst, The Merchants of the Staple, 17 L. Q. REv. 56 (1901), reprinted in 3 SELECT
ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW 16 (1909).
8. 23 SELDEN SOCIETY, supra note 6, at xxv; 5 HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW 106 (1924); 3 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *32-33. I THE LITTLE RED BOOK OF
BRISTOL 58 (Bickley ed. 1900) states that a summary procedure is one of the differences
between the law merchant and the common law. ("[1]n genere prizo qnod celerius
deliberat se ipsam.") For a discussion of the law merchant procedure in cases in the
central courts see 46 SELDEN SOCIETY, in II SELECT CASES ON THE LAW MERCHANT XiX
(Hall ed. 1929).
9. 23 SELDEN SOCIETY, supra note 6, at xiv Cf. CoKE, FOURTH INSTITUTE *272.
10. 11 EDw. 1 (1283).
11. 13 EDW. 1 (1285). A comprehensive study of this legislation may be found in
PLUCKNETT, LEGISLATION OF EDWARD I, c. VI, at 138-50 (1949).
12. 27 EDW. 3, c. 9 (1353) (the effect of a recognizance in the staple).
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proceedings to establish the debt." Obviously, this system provided an
exceedingly effective method of debt collection. 4
Subsequent developments altered this picture substantially. With
increased wealth and the improvement in transport, fairs diminished in
importance with a consequent withering of the piepowder courts.' The
competition of the newly developed device of the bill of exchange and
promissory note resulted in a marked decline in the use of the statutory
recognizance.' Contributing to this decline was the disruptive effect of
the Hundred Years' War on all credit transactions. 7
As a result of these changes in commercial practice and because of
the failure of the English to develop the early commercial courts, 8 mer-
chants found it necessary to resort to the common law and chancery courts
for the settlement of mercantile disputes. 9 As early as 1622, when Ger-
ard Malynes published the first English treatise on the law merchant,
the staple was regarded as the way "the course of Trade was managed
heretofore."'" Of the methods of determining mercantile controversies,
Malynes found four: admiralty, arbitration, merchant's courts, and the
civil or common law of the kingdom." Noting that the law merchant
requires "brevitie and expedition," he stated that the procedure in ad-
miralty, in the commercial courts, and by arbitration was brief and sum-
mary.2 2 But surprisingly his greatest plaudits were reserved for the
common law courts in England. After several disparaging remarks about
13. 49 SELDEN SOCIETY, in III SELEc CASES ON THE LAW MERCHANT XXiV, lXXXV-
lxxxvii (Hall ed. 1932); Ward, supra note 7, at 303-04; 2 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*160; MALYNES, CONSUETUDO, VEL LEX MERCATORIA, C. XX, at 496 (1622). "By that
law (if once a man acknowledged himself [to] be indebted to a Merchant, and payed
not his money at his day) without process, without pleading, without further sute or
judgement, the Merchant shall have present Execution against his Debtor, both for
Body, Goods, and Lands." STONE, THE READING UPON THE STATUTE OF THE THIRTEENTH
OF ELIZABETH TOUCHING BANKRUPTS 3 (1656).
14. 49 SELDEN SOCIETY, supra note 13, at xx-xxi. Lord Brougham suggested that
this system was analogous to his proposed summary procedure. See note 71 infra.
15. 23 SELDEN SOCIETY, supra note 6, at xix; 3 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARiES *33;
BEWES, op. cit. supra note 6; 5 HOLDSWoRTH, op. cit. supra note 8, at 91, 112.
16. 49 SELDEN SOCIETY, supra note 13, at xxvii. It has been suggested that these
bonds may have been negotiable. Sayles, A Dealer in Wardrobe Bills, 3 EcoN. HIST. REV.
268 (1931). For the development of the negotiable instrument, see Jenks, The Early
History of Negotiable Instruments, 9 L. Q. REv. 70 (1893), reprinted in 3 SELECT
ESSAYS ON ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 51 (1909); 8 HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY
OF EGLISH LAW 126-32 (1926). For its relation to the present subject, see note 48 infra.
17. 49 SELDEN SoCIETY, supra note 13, at xxvii.
18. 5 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. supra note 8, at 148-54.
19. The change is strikingly illustrated by comparing the titles and cases cited in
STATHAMI, ABRIDGEMENT OF THE LAW (Kingelsmith transl. 1915) first published about
1490 with ViNER, GENERAL ABRIDGEMENT OF LAW AND EQUITY (2d ed. 1791-1795).
20. CONSUETUDO, vEL LEX MERCATORIA, C. XX, at 495 (1622).
21. Id. at 443. See also c. XIV-XVII.
22. Ibid.
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delay in the Chancery Court,"3 Malynes observed that in the common law
courts, "men are to reduce the state or issue of their cause upon one pre-
emptorie exception to bee tried by the verdict of twelve men, whereby
matters are determined with expedition."2 Nowhere in Europe have
they discovered "so just and so well devised a means . . ." for speedily
resolving disputes.2"
Subsequent commentators on the law merchant, e.g., Charles Mol-
loy,2" Giles Jacob," and Wyndham Beawes,2 8 were content to cite applic-
able decisions of the law courts without comment on the utility and
effectiveness of the common law procedure. John Marius, however,
refused to discuss legal actions at all since the "right dealing Merchant
doth not care how little he hath to do in the Common Law, or things of
1129that nature. . ..
Turning to the publications of non-legal writers, one quickly dis-
covers that common law procedure did not enjoy for long the praise
Malynes gave to it and that the delays in chancery became even more ag-
gravated."0 Writing in 1740, the winner of a Chancery suit lasting thir-
teen years found legal expenses so great that he quoted Hannibal [sic] to
the effect that "a few more such Victories would undo him. 31 In 1741,
another writer advised a prospective litigant to arbitrate rather than
sue at law: "The Law, my good Friend, I look upon, more than any one
Thing, as the proper Punishment of an over-hasty and preverse Spir-
it. . "32 A correspondent reported that in debtor's prison there could
be purchased for a six pence a book of instructions "wherein it was
pointed out to debtors how to harass creditors. '3  The debt collection
23. Id. at 467. (The delay was occasioned by the method employed by the Chancellor
to inform himself of the customs of the merchants.)
24. Id. at 472.
25. Id. at 462.
26. DE JuRE MARITIMO (7th ed. 1722).
27. LEx MERCATORIA (2d ed. 1729).
28. LEx MERcATORiA RED VIvA (1761).
29. ADVicE CONCERNING BILLS OF EXCHANGE 3 (1700), reprinted in the Appendix
to ROBERTS, THE MERCHANTS MAP OF COMMERCE (4th ed. 1700).
30. See notes 31-33 infra and 1 GENTLEMAN'S MAGAZINE 100 (1731); 20 id. 219
(1750). For additional sources see Sunderland, supra note 5.
31. 10 GENTLEMAN'S MAGAZINE 388, 397 (1740). "For while their Purses can
dispute, There's No End of th' immortal suit."
32. 11 GENTLEMAN'S MAGAZINE 34 (1741). Illustrative of this writer's impression
of the law courts is his story of observing at the assizes a sign representing on one side
a man all in rags wringing his hands with a label reading "he had lost his suit," and on
the other side "a Man that had not a Rag left, but stark naked, capering and triumphing,
That he had carry'd his Cause. .. ."
33. 92 GENTLEMAN'S MAGAZINE 638 (Pt. 1, 1822). In order to cause creditors the
greatest expense and the most delay, debtors were given the following advice:
'When arrested and held to bail, and after being served with a declaration,
you may plead a general issue, which brings you to trial the sooner of any
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system was designated in a Parliamentary report as a "glaring defect in
our commercial jurisprudence." 4
No doubt some of the delay in the disposition of litigation could be
attributed to the increased business of the courts,3" but there were defects
in the prescribed procedure which contributed substantially to this re-
sult.3 In the Chancery Court, the glaring defect was the time consuming
procedure for taking testimony by written deposition.3" In the common
law courts, pleading was the chief offender. At the time Malynes ex-
pressed his admiration for common law pleading, the change from
informal oral pleas to the system of written pleadings had just been com-
pleted.38 As that system developed, it became increasingly complex and
technical, and this factor, in conjunction with the shift of responsibility
for the truth of the pleading away from counsel, caused difficulties."
Because the highly technical rules governing pleading were rigidly
enforced, a case might be dismissed for some defect in form irrespective
of the merits of the case.4" The more significant defect in the system
was its failure to provide a method of determining the factual basis of a
pleading prior to trial.4 It was this weakness that unscrupulous lawyers
advised debtors to exploit." By pleading fictitious defenses to an action
plea that you can put in; but if you want to vex your plaintiff, put in a
special plea. .. .'
By following the procedure suggested in this pamphlet, the debtor incurs expenses of
30 10/ whereas the creditor's costs are £314. The author of the pamphlet concluded
with the observation that a debtor following the prescribed procedure will "most
likely . . . hear no more of the business."
34. Third Report by the Commissioners Appointed to Inquire into the Practice and
Proceedings of the Superior Courts of Common Law 147 (1831). See also 47 H. Comm.
J. 640 (1792) (report and evidence before a committee appointed to inquire into the
practice and effect of imprisonment for debt) ; 21 H. Comm. J. 892 (1732) (an inquiry
into delays resulting from the fees charged by numerous officials of the courts).
35. 45 EDINBURGH REV. 458, 462, 466 (1827). Cf. 46 BLACKWOOD, EDINBURGH
MAGAZINE 754 (1839) (statistics on population and trade).
36. Bowen, supra note 4; Odgers, Changes in Procedure and i the Law of Evidence,
in A CENTURY OF LAW REFORM 203 (1901).
37. PARKES, HISTORY OF THE COURT OF CHANCERY 453-58, 561-67 (1828); 2
BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 181-86 (1827). See also Birrell, Changes.
in Equity, Procedure, and Principles, in A CENTURY OF LAW REFORM 177 (1901).
38. Holdsworth, The Development of Written and Oral Pleading, in 2 SELECT
ESSAYS IN ANGLo-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 614, 631 (1908).
39. Id. at 631.
40. See HEPBURN, THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CODE PLEADING § 63, at 64
(1897); Pound, The Causes of Popdar Dissatisfaction with the Administration of
Justice, 29 A.B.A. REP. (Pt. I) 395, 408 (1906). It has been suggested that the failure
of Roman law to develop a summary procedure may be attributed to the great flexibility
of procedure prior to the absolute monarchy. WENGER, INSTITUTES OF THE ROMAN LAW
Of CIVIL PROCEDURE § 32, at 324 (Fiske transl. rev. ed. 1940).
41. Sunderland, Modern Procedural Devices, in FIELD CENTENARY ESSAYS 83, 85
(1949).
42. Third Report by the Commissioners Appointed to Inquire into the Practice and
Proceedings of the Superior Courts of Common Law 147, 222 (1831).
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for debt or on commercial paper, a debtor obtained certain advantages.
Not only did he discourage his creditor by the prospect of great expense,
but the resulting delay gave the debtor additional time either to secure
sufficient funds to satisfy the debt or to dissipate the existing funds
available for payment prior to a bankruptcy.43 This practice of false
pleading for the purpose of delay was common, and was in fact accepted
by the common law courts so long as the plea was of the ordinary type.4"
To remedy at least some of the evils resulting from sham pleading,
Lord Brougham, in 1828, proposed the adoption of the Scottish summary
procedure for actions brought on notes, bonds, and bills of exchange.45
In support of the proposal, he stated that "whenever a strong presump-
tion of right appears on the part of a plaintiff, the burthen of disputing
his claim should be thrown on the defendant. This I would extend to
such cases as bills of exchange, bonds, mortgages, and other such securi-
ties. In those cases I think the plaintiff should be allowed to have his
judgment, upon due notice given, unless good cause be, in the first in-
stance, shown to the contrary, and security given to prosecute a suit for
setting the instrument aside. This is a mode well known in the law of
Scotland .... "16 The origin of the procedure proposed by Lord Broug-
ham requires mention of certain continental developments.
As in England, the commercial interests on the continent demanded
some method of collecting debts quickly, and this demand was met at an
early time by the development of the executory procedure in Italy.17 This
procedure permitted a creditor to apply ex parte to the court for execu-
tion in cases where the debtor acknowledged the debt in writing and
43. 19 Jurist (Pt. 2) 59 (1855) ; 25 L. T. 209 (1855).
44. 9 HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 306-07 (1926) ; STEPHENS,
PLEADING § 228, at 430-31 (Andrew's ed. 1894) ; 1 CHITTY, PLEADING 541-45 (11th Am.
1851).
45. The Present State of the Law, delivered on February 7, 1828, 18 PARL. DEB.
(N.S.) 127 (1828); 2 LoRD BROUGHAM'S SPEECHES 287 (1838). For an analysis of this
speech see Holdsworth, The Movement for Reforms in the Law (1793-1832), 56 L. Q.
REV. 340 (1941).
46. 18 PARL. DEB. (N.S.) 127, 179 (1828).
47. ENGLEMANN, A HISTORY OF CONTINENTAL CIVIL PROCEDURE 497 (Millar transl.,
7 Continental Legal History Series 1927). By borrowing certain legal concepts from
Roman law, lawyers developed the documentary procedure from the Lombard custom
of pignoratio which permitted a type of distraint by a creditor upon the goods of a
debtor without judicial action. The conditions of this custom are prescribed in the
Laws of Rothari § 245-57, reprinted in II TROYA, CODICE DIPLOMATIcO LONGOBARDO 259-
72 (1853). See also 6 HODGKIN, ITALY AND HER INVADERS 210 (2d ed. 1916); and
CALISSE, A HISTORY OF ITALIAN LAW 765-66 (8 Continental Legal History Series 1928).
The need of creditors for some such procedure is indicated by the fact that there was
in use in Alexandria until the fourth century a somewhat similar procedure. See Wenger,
op. cit. supra note 40, at 328-30.
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granted to the creditor the right to execution without a hearing." The
cognate practice in English law was confession of judgment by warrant
of attorney, 9 and a similar practice existed at this time in Scotland."
The development of the executory procedure in France51 and Holland52
extended the remedy to actions on debts acknowledged by certain speci-
fied public or private documents. Characteristically, these procedures
resulted in an immediate judgment for the plaintiff if the validity of the
document was not attacked. 3 In France, only certain specified defenses
were permitted to actions on public documents, and under certain circum-
stances, the defendant was required to post security. 4 In Holland, on the
other hand, the plaintiff was required to post security as a prerequisite to a
final judgment.5
These continental procedures were familia" to Scotsmen since the
political feuds with the English sent Scottish students to the continent
to pursue their legal studies.56 During Tudor times, French universities
48. ENGLEMANN, op. cit. supra note 47. The adoption of an executory procedure in
Italy closely paralleled the development in that country of the concept of the negotiable
instrument. See note 16 supra.
49. Millar, The Formative Principles of Civil Procedure I, 18 ILL. L. REV. 1, 8
(1923) ; see 1 TIDD, PRACTICE *591 (1828) ; 3 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *304, *397.
As early as 1201, long before the recognition of the promissory note, there was in common
use in England a type of recognizance in which the borrower confessed judgment and
nothing remained to be done by the lender but levy execution. 2 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND,
THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 204 (2d ed. 1898). It has been said that this "executory
contract" was used as security in lending "large sums of money." Id. This was a
practice distinct from the Statute Merchant discussed previously. But cf. 1 GLENN,
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES 20 n. 40 (rev. ed. 1940). After the
promissory note became legally enforceable, Chitty states that the note with a warrant
of attorney became "one of the most usual collateral securities on loans of money. .. ."
2 CHITT, PRACTICE 334 (1st Am. from 1st Eng. 1835). The failure of Malynes, Jacobs,
or Beawes to mention the cognovit note is no doubt attributable to the late date at which
such notes became legally acceptable. The cognovit note is said to be obsolete in England
today. 19 HALSBURY, LAWS OF ENGLAND § 526, at 224 (2d. ed. 1935).
50. 1 BELL, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF SCOTLAND 4 (5th ed. 1826) ; 1 BELL,
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF SCOTLAND § 68, at 30 (5th ed. 1860); see illustrative cases
in 17 MORISON, DICTIONARY OF DECISIONS 14988-96 (1806).
51. ENGLEMANN, op. cit. supra note 47, at 699-706. Notaries were required to keep
a register of contracts they had executed, and all such documents were enforceable by the
executory process.
52. 2 VAN LEEUWEN, COMMENTARIES ON ROMAN-DUTcH LAW, Bk. IV, c. XV., at
120-22 (Kotz6 transl. 2d ed. 1921). This Dutch documentary procedure, called Namptisse-
inent, was allowed in actions brought on public documents, or in cases where defendant
was sued on his own signature.
53. See 2 VAN LEEUwEN, op. cit. supra note 52, at 121; ENGLEMANN, op. cit. supra
note 47, at 700 (actions on private documents).
54. ENGLEMANN, op. cit. s pra note 47, at 701. Payment, release, or extension of
time were the only defenses permitted.
55. 2 VAN LEEUWEN, op. cit. supra note 52, at 121-22, and Bk. IV, c. xxvii, at 220.
Defenses to this proceeding are described in Bk. V, c. XIX, at 468-69.
56. At the outbreak of the war of independence, the law of Scotland was closely
akin to English law and there was a Scottish version of Glanvill's book. 1 POLLOCK AND
MAITLAND, op. cit. supra note 49, at 222-24. Cf. COKE, FOURTH INSTITUTES, c. 75.
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were the most popular, but with the waning of French influence follow-
ing the Reformation, Scotsmen journeyed instead to Leyden or Utrecht
for their legal education.57 Thus it is not surprising to find that Scotland
in 1681 found it necessary "for the flourishing of trade" to enact a sum-
mary procedure on foreign bills of exchange.5" The effect of this legis-
lation was to extend the existing Scottish practice based on the debtor's
consent to immediate execution (expressly stated in an instrument) to all
actions on foreign bills of exchange, regardless of actual consent.59 It is
reasonable to suppose that this extension was patterned on the familiar
French and Dutch law, particularly since the preamble recited that the
purpose of the statute was to "conforme to the custome of other parts."6
Subsequent legislation strengthened the remedy and extended it to other
instruments, and it became known in Scottish law as "summary dili-
gence."6
A brief description of the procedure established by this legislation
is instructive. If a bill or note is dishonored by non-payment or non-
acceptance, and a protest is registered in the books of Council and Session
or in the books of a Sheriff Court within six months after that date,
the holder is entitled to the ordinary methods of execution on judgments. 2
Protection against false claims is afforded defendants by a procedure
for staying execution. Thus a creditor may proceed by registration and
obtain an order charging the debtor to pay within six days, but the
57. Walton, The Relationship of the Law of France to the Law of Scotland, 14
JURID. REV. 17 (1902); Gardner, French and Dutch Influences, in THE SOURCES AND
LITERATURE OF SCOTS LAW 226 (The Stair Society 1936); The Legal System of Scot-
land, 66 SOL. J. 48 (1921); 4 HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 248 (3d ed.
1945). It was estimated that 1600 Scottish law students studied at Leyden University
between the years 1600 and 1800. In 8 CAMPBELL, op. cit. supra note 4 at 233, in observing
that Lord Brougham's legal education was at the University of Edinburgh, the following
comment is made:
According to ancient usage, he ought to have been sent to prosecute his legal
studies at the University of Leyden; but since the time of Boswell . . . the
tuition of foreign jurists has been considered unnecessary to qualify for the
Scottish bar ...
See also Mitchell, Scottish Law Students in. Italy in The Later Middle Ages, 49 JURID.
REV. 19 (1937).
58. ACT OF PA.RL., 1681, c. 20.
59. 1 BELL, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF SCOTLAND 4 (5th ed. 1826).
60. Bell's statement [53 LAw MAG. OR Q. RaV. 77, 79 (1855)] that the decree of
registration is based on the Actio Judicata of the Roman law is not inconsistent with
this statement, since the executory procedure itself was developed from Roman law
concepts. See ENGLEMANN, op. cit. supra note 47, at 498-99.
61. ACT OF PAr., 1696, c. 36 (procedure extended to inland bills and precepts);
12 GEO. 3, c. 72, § 42 and 43 (defined the rights and liabilities of parties to the bill).
62. GLOAG AND HENDERSON, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF SCOTLAND 299-300 (5th
ed. 1952); I BELL, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF SCOTLAND 4, 387 (5th ed. 1826);
1 BELL, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF SCOTLAND § 343-44, at 126 (5th ed. 1860) ; LORIMER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF SCOTLAND § 1605, at 388 (6th ed. 1894).
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debtor in turn may obtain a suspension of the charge or a "sist of dili-
gence." This is accomplished by the debtor filing with the court a note
of suspension setting forth the charge and the reasons why he believes
it should be suspended. 3 Ordinarily he must furnish "caution" (security)
for the principal sum demanded plus expenses, although this is discre-
tionary with the court.64 If the note of suspension is passed, the case
goes to the court for trial, and pending the hearing, execution is sus-
pended. If the note is refused, execution proceeds as in the ordinary
case.
6 5
Lord Brougham, a member of the Scottish bar, was of course fa-
miliar with the success of this remedy in Scotland, and as might be
expected he considered the possibility of its use in English procedure.
Though he first proposed such a reform for England in 1828, it was not
until 1853 that he submitted to Parliament a bill incorporating the Scot-
tish practice.66 This measure was approved by the House of Lords, but
was allowed to die in the House of Commons.6 The bill was reintro-
duced in the next session of Parliament, but this time a competing meas-
ure was advocated by Keating, a member of Parliament from Reading.
In the debates on the bill Brougham pointed out the defectiveness of the
existing English practice and noted that the proposed measure was al-
ready a part of the law in some form in France, Holland, Belgium, and
the Italian States, as well as Scotland.69 That the procedure was a boon
to commerce and trade was shown by statistics establishing that execu-
tion was suspended in less than one per cent of the cases employing sum-
63. See 1 BELL, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF SCOTLAND 387 (5th ed. 1826);
1 BELL, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF SCOTLAND § 276, at 100, and Bk. IV, § 2272-90, at
842-49 (5th ed. 1860).
64. Ibid.
65. 12 GREEN, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF SCOTLAND 206 (Chisholm ed. 1899).
The court considers the matter and passes or refuses the note "as may seem just."
Id. at 211. When caution is furnished, the note of suspension is usually passed. Id. at 217.
For illustrative cases see Ross v. Millar & Baird, 4 Scot. Jur. 163 (1831) (forgery,
suspension without caution) ; Kechans v. Barr, 21 Sess. Cas. (4th Ser.) 75 (1893) (denial
of signature, suspension without caution) ; Renwick v. Stamford, Spalding, and Boston
Banking Co., 19 Sess. Cas. (4th Ser.) 163 (1891) (fraud, suspension with caution).
66. 131 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) 618 (1854).
67. See 136 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) 494-95 (1854-1855); 53 LAW MAG. OR Q. REV.
77 (1855).
68. 136 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) 494 (1854-1855) (Lord Brougham's bill); 136 PARL.
DEB. (3d ser.) 1263 (1854-1855) ; 137 PAu.. DEB. (3d ser.) 1274 (1855); 138 P.ARL. DEE.
(3d ser.) 2292, 2330 (1855). Sir Henry Keating was a member of the English bar and
later a judge. See 30 D.N.B. 275 (1892). The basic method incorporated in Keating's
bill was suggested by Mr. Thomas Lott in Third Report by the Commissioners Appointed
to Inquire into the Practice and Proceedings of the Superior Courts of Common Law
147, 148.
69. 135 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) 1361 (1854) ; 136 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) 494 (1854-1855).
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mary diligence in Scotland.7" Opposition was extensive; it ranged from
the contention that there were no frivolous defenses or delays in this
type of case to the complaint that Brougham's sole objective was to supply
another political job-that of registrar.71 Since the proposed system of
registration was foreign to English law, there is no doubt that English
lawyers viewed with suspicion, if not with downright hostility, this Scot-
tish innovation. 2 Keating remarked "that the introduction of Scottish
law was unnecessary, as tending only to encumber and clog the wheels of
justice."7 " The proposals of Brougham and Keating were referred to a
select committee composed of lawyers and merchants, which, after hear-
ing the evidence of lawyers, bankers, and merchants, recommended for
passage Keating's bill, deeming it "unadvisable to introduce a new system
of procedure if the forms of the English law could be made available for
the object in view ... ""
Keating's Act, entitled the Summary Procedure on Bills of Exchange
Act (1855), became effective on October 24, 1855."5 It had a generally
favorable reception from the bar since it was regarded as "comparatively
moderate and reasonable" when compared to the "startling measure pro-
posed by Lord Brougham."7 6 Brougham himself acquiesced in the passage
of the act in order not to impede the adoption of this reform still longer.
The procedure thus established required the plaintiff to obtain a
specially indorsed writ warning the defendant that judgment would be
entered against him unless he obtained leave to appear within twelve days
after the service of the writ.78 Leave to appear and defend was to be
70. 131 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) 620 (1854); 132 PARL. DEB. (3d set.) 362 (1854).
71. 137 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) 1249 (1855). See also 135 PARL. DES. (3d ser.) 1361
(1854). The latter citation is to Brougham's defense of the measure. Besides refuting
the arguments made in Commons, he noted the similarity of his proposal to the old
statutory recognizances in these words:
The process, six centuries ago, under statutes merchant and statutes staple,
was exactly the summary diligence now desired, by which the debtor's person.
land, and goods were answerable, without any action; and this, in all cases of
debt acknowledged. Had bills of exchange, therefore, existed in Edward
the First's time, to them this summary execution would of course have
been applied. (P. 1364).
72. 19 JURIST (Pt. 2) 59-60 (1855).
73. 137 PARL. DES. (3d set.) 1267 (1855).
74. 19 Jurist (Pt. 2) 67, 214 (1855) ; 25 L.T. 67 (1855).
75. 18 & 19 VICT., c. 67 (1855).
76. 54 LAW MAG. OR Q. REV. 388 (1855) ; 25 L.T. 209 (1855) ; 19 JURIST (Pt. 2) 389
(1855).
77. 139 PAmr. DES. (3d ser.) 951-52 (1855) ; 25 L.T. 186 (1855).
78. 18 & 19 Vicr., c. 67, § 1, Schedule A (1855).
"A special indorsement is a statement of claim and should be so headed. It should be
signed by the counsel or solicitor who drafted it, or by a duly authorized clerk of such
solicitor. It must contain full particulars with dates and items sufficient to inform the
defendant specifically what is the claim that is made against him, so that he may be able
to make up his mind whether he will pay or fight. It must also state all material facts
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granted either upon defendant paying into court the amount demanded
by the writ, or when affidavits disclosed a defense to the action or facts
the judge considered sufficient to require a trial."9 Thus Keating's Act
differed from the proposal of Lord Brougham in two important particu-
lars: first, the English procedure, in avoiding the Scottish system of
registration, postponed the entry of judgment until after the date set for
the hearing of the motion; and second, Scottish summary diligence as-
sumed that the creditor was entitled to execution against his debtor's
property unless the debtor suspended execution by furnishing security,
whereas Keating's Act required the posting of security as only one of
several alternatives available to a defendant who asked leave to defend
an action prior to the entry of judgment.
The extension of Keating's Act to other types of cases is a familiar
story. The rules of court established by the Supreme Court of Judicature
Act, 1873,"0 and 1875,81 extended the summary judgment procedure in-
corporated in Order XIV to actions for debts and liquidated sums of
money by permitting specially indorsed writs in all such cases.82 Later
amendments expanded the procedure to include actions by landlords for
the recovery of possession of land, actions to recover the possession of a
specific chattel, cases where plaintiff claims possession of property form-
ing a security for the payment of money, and claims for specific per-
formance of contracts in writing for the sale or purchase of property.8"
In accordance with a recommendation of the Hanworth Committee in
necessary to constitute a complete cause of action." ODGERS, PLEADING AND PRACTIcE 47
(Harwood ed. 15th ed. 1955). For a discussion of the purpose of special indorsements and
a comparison with writs not so indorsed, see 16 JURIST (Pt. 2) 369-70 (1852).
79. 18 & 19 VIcv., c. 67, § 2 (1855). For a discussion of summary judgment
procedure in England see ODGERS, op. cit. supra note 78, at c. 5.
80. 36 & 37 VicT., c. 66, Rule 7 of the Schedule. The extension of the summary
judgment procedure was recommended by the Judicature Commission. See Judicature
Commission, First Report, 25 PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS 1, 11 (1868-1869).
81. 38 & 39 VIcT., c. 77, Order III, r. 6, and Order XIV. The procedure established
by Order XIV requires the plaintiff to verify the cause of action and swear that in his
belief there is no defense to the action. This additional requirement was recommended
by the Judicature Commission in conjunction with the suggested extension of the
summary judgment procedure, and was not found in Keating's Act. Judicature Com-
mission, First Report, 25 PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS 3, 11 (1868-1869).
82. "In all actions where the plaintiff seeks merely to recover a debt or liquidated
demand in money payable by the defendant, with or without interest, arising upon a
contract, express or implied, as, for instance, on a bill of exchange, promissory note,
cheque, or other simple contract debt or on a bond or contract under seal for payment
of a liquidated amount of money, or on a statute where the sum sought to be recovered
is a fixed sum of money or in the nature of a debt, or on a guaranty, whether under seal
or not, where the claim against the principal is in respect of such debt or liquidated
demand, bill, cheque, or note, or on a trust, the writ of summons may be specially
indorsed. . . ." 38 & 39 VIcr., c. 77, Order III, r. 6 (1875).
83. GREENBAUM AND READE, THE KING'S BENCH MASTERS AND ENGLISH INTER-
LOCUTORY PRACTiCE 76-79 (1932).
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1933,8" the procedure was extended still further to include all actions in
the Queen's Bench division except actions for libel, slander, malicious
prosecution, false imprisonment, seduction, breach of promise of mar-
riage, and actions in which fraud is alleged by the plaintiff.85 The
specific exclusions were based on the Committee's belief that the sum-
mary judgment procedure was not appropriate for certain types of cases.88
Twenty years later, the Evershed Committee, accepting the limita-
tion on the Order XIV summary judgment procedure, recommended a
new procedure to complement Order XIV in cases where summary judg-
ment is not available because of the existence of a genuine defense to the
actionY To expedite the disposition of such cases, the committee pro-
posed the adoption of a rule permitting the plaintiff to apply to the court
by affidavit for a trial without pleadings.88 The Committee believed
that if this "new approach" were confined to suitable cases, a consider-
able saving in time and money could be effected.89 In discussing the
classes of cases to which this new procedure should apply, the Committee
suggested that it be limited to actions in which the sole or principal
question is one of law or the construction of a document.9" To be spe-
84. Business of Courts Committee, Interim Report, March 1933, par. 15-17, printed
in X GREAT BRITAIN, HOUSE OF COMmONS, SESSIONAL PAPERS (1932-1933). The amend-
ment made Order XIV coextensive with the "New Procedure" of Order XXXVIII A.
The "New Procedure" was an attempt to expedite trial by requiring a summons for
directions to be returned before a judge, the restriction of jury trial, and the abridgement
of the time limitations for taking procedural steps. This procedure was subsequently
abandoned on the recommendation of the Royal Commission on the Despatch of Business
at Common Law 1934-1936, Final Report, par. 140-43, at 50-51. For a discussion of
these developments, see Millar, A Septenniun of English Civil Procedure, 1932-1939,
25 WASH. U.L.Q. 525 (1940).
85. This change is commented on in 77 SOL. J. 476 (1933).
86. Business of Courts Committee, Interim Report, March 1933, par. 15-17, printed
in X GREAT BRITAIN, HOUSE OF COIMONS, SESSIONAL PAPERS (1932-1933). As illustra-
tions of the type of case considered inappropriate for Order XIV, the committee
specifically mentioned actions for libel and for the recovery of damages in "running
down" cases.
87. Committee on Supreme Court Practice and Procedure, Final Report, par. 94, at
33 (1953). As an integral part of the proposed "new approach," the committee recom-
mended the extension of the originating summons procedure in use in the Chancery
Division of the High Court. See par. 84-90, at 30-32, and Appendix IV. For cases in
which the new approach was not appropriate, the committee recommended a strengthening
of the summons for directions. Id. at par. 80, at 29. Order XXX, providing for the
"Summons for Directions," was accordingly amended in 1954. See ANNUAL PRACTICE
477. Order XXX (1956). For comment on this procedure, analogous to American pre-
trial orders, see 98 SoL. J. 598 (1954) and ODGERS, op. cit. supra note 78, at c. 17.
88. Committee on Supreme Court Practice and Procedure, Final Report, par. 95,
at 34 (1953). See also Appendix V.
89. Id. at par. 92, at 33; par. 96, at 34. This recommendation had the support of
the commercial community. See id. at par. 86-88, at 31-32; par. 90, at 32.
90. Id. at par. 98-99, at 35-36.
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cifically excluded were personal injury actions and those cases excluded
from the Order XIV summary judgment procedure.9 '
The recommendation of the Committee was given effect in 1954 by
the adoption of Order XIV B, entitled "Trial without, Pleadings."92
Described as a "major experiment,"93 the rule provides that in cases com-
menced by a specially indorsed writ, plaintiff may apply to the court by
summons for a trial without pleadings. The summons must be supported
by an affidavit summarizing the issues between the parties and indicating
the reason for the contention that pleadings are unnecessary. Defendant
must answer by affidavit within 14 days from the service of the sum-
mons stating his defense and any reason he may have for not submitting
the case for trial without further pleadings. At the hearing of the sum-
mons, the master may order the case to stand for trial on the basis of the
affidavits, but if he is not satisfied that the case is a proper one for the
new procedure, he may either dismiss the summons or give other suitable
directions.
While the order promulgated does accept the proposal of the Ever-
shed Committee to exclude from the "new approach" personal injury and
road accident cases in addition to those cases excluded from Order XIV,94
no attempt is made to define the type of case for which this procedure
is appropriate. It has been suggested that the procedure is best suited
for friendly actions or test cases95 and cases where a question of law or
construction is involved.9 6 In this connection, it should be noted that the
new procedure is available in the Chancery Division by reason of the
amendment to Order III permitting special indorsement of writs in any
action in the Chancery Division.9" The result of the amendments is that
with the exception of personal injury and road accident cases, the new
procedure applies to the same type of cases as does the summary judgment
procedure but the two procedures are "mutually exclusive in intention."9
The new procedure of Order XIV B provides an alternative summary
91. Id. at par. 99, at 35.
92. ANNUAL PRAcTIcE 1956. Order XIV B is discussed in 99 SOL. J. 157-58 (1955)
and ODGERS, op. cit. supra note 78, at 76-78.
93. 99 SOL. J. 157 (1955).
94. Order XIV B specifically excludes actions for personal injuries based on negli-
gence, nuisance, or breach of duty, for damage to a vehicle in a road accident, and any
action for death arising under the Fatal Accidents Act or Carriage by Air Act.
95. 99 SOL. J. 158 (1955).
96. ANNuAL PRAcrIcE 208 (1956).
97. Order III, r. 6, id. at 16.
98. 99 SOL. 3. 157 (1955).
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remedy in cases where summary judgment is not available because of
the existence of factual issues for trial.9
Thus after a century of development, further expansion of Keating's
Act has come to at least a temporary standstill. 00 While its growth was
spectacular, it is well to remember that the remedy has always been limited
to plaintiffs in certain types of cases. The amendment of the Hanworth
Committee extending the procedure to "all other actions" in the Queen's
Bench Division -seems broad, but the femedy has actually been used in
only ohe "runriing-down" ,ase, Dummer v. Brown, ' where the Court of
Appeals, by a split decision, affirmed a summary judgment for the plain-
tiff in. an action brought under Lord Campbell's Act, earning the dis-
approval of at least one commentator in so doing.0 2
H.
Since the procedure adopted in the United States was substantially
the same as that found in England, the identical difficulty of sham
pleading was encountered here. From.the earliest time, states wrestled
with the problem, devising various methods to remedy this weakness in
the system of pleading. Typically, two methods were employed. One
was the motion to strike as sham; the other was the requirement of veri-
fication. The former failed not only because of the high standard of
proof required,' but also because many states adhered to the rule that
a general denial could not be struck.' The verification device was used
in various ways: some states requiring all pleadings to be verified,0 '
some requiring verification of the defendant's plea only,' and still others
99. "Little use has so far been made of this procedure and in view of its attendant
risks and possibility of delay this is hardly surprising." ODGERS, op. cit. supra note 78,
at 78.
100. Prior to 1954, summary judgment was available in the Chancery Division in
actions for the specific performance of contracts in writing for the sale or purchase
of property. See Order XIV A. This order was amended in 1954 to permit the use of
summary judgment in cases where the contract is not in writing, and where there are
alternative claims for damages, for rescission, or for the forfeiture or return of a
deposit. 99 SOL. J. 141 (1955). The 1954 amendment of Order III, rule 6 to permit the
special indorsement of writs in any action in the Chancery Division has the effect of
extending the summary judgment procedure to all actions in that court. It has been
stated, however, that "in practice, from the very nature of the actions dealt with, it is
but rarely resorted to." ODGERS, op. cit. supra note 78, at 330.
101. 1 All E. R. 1158 (1953).
102. Note, 70 L. Q. REV. 22 (1954).
103. The inference of falsity must be "irresistable." See 1 CHITTY, PLEADING *568
(16th Am. 1876). Note, 72 Am. Dec. 521-22 (1886).
104. "The general denial, at least when verified, cannot be struck out as sham on
motion." POMEROY, CODE REMEDIES § 561, at 914 (5th ed. 1929). Compare Wayland v.
Tysen, 45 N.Y. 281 (1871), with Coykendall v. Robinson, 39 N.J.L. 98 (1876).
105. N.Y. Code of Procedure § 133 (1848).
106. MILLAR, CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE TRIAL COURT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 238
(1952).
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requiring verification only in particular types of cases. °7 Experience with
verification has not been favorable because the requirement tends to de-
generate into a mere formality.
"
'
In addition to these conventional devices, some states attempted at a
very early time to develop true summary procedures.' The Virginia
notice and motion for judgment procedure had its inception in a statute
enacted ifi 1732, was greatly enlarged by the Code of 1849, and applies
today to all common law actions."' By utilizing this procedure, notice
and motion for judgment are substituted for the writ and complaint
required by the ordinary procedure. This resulting simplification of
pleading and notice requirements eliminates delays incident to the ordi-
nary procedure in arriving at issue."" Since a trial, is contemplated and
the right to a jury is preserved, the Virginia procedure is free from the
usual criticisms directed at summary judgment procedures based on denial
of a fair hearing."2 Resembling the Evershed Committee's "new ap-
proach" more closely than the Order XIV summary judgment procedure,
the motion for judgment practice has had great success in Virginia and
establishes the potentialities of this approach to the problem of eliminat-
ing delays.
Aside from these early American innovations, summary judgment
procedures in the United States had their source in English practice.'13
Agitation for the adoption of the English reform emphasized the needs
of the commercial community and the ineptitude of the ordinary pro-
107. See, e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-1033 (Burns 1946) ; TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-924
(Off. Ed. 1956). (A defendant may deny the execution of a written instrument only by
a pleading under oath.)
108. See, MICHAEL, ELEMENTS OF LEGAL CONTROVERSY 536-40 (1948); Marshall
v. Rowe, 126 Neb. 817, 254 N.W. 480 (1934) ; Institute on Federal Rules, -Washington,
D. C. 52 (A.B.A- 1939).
109. Millar, Three American Ventures in Summary Civil Procedure, 38 YALE L. J.
193 (1928).
110. Id. at 221. See also Fowler, Virginia Notice of Motion Procedure, 24 VA. L.
REv. 711 (1938) ; Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia, Rule 3:3 (1954).
111. Millar, Three American Ventures in Sumnary Civil Procedure, 38 YALE LJ.
193, 213 (1928).
112. VA. CODE § 8-211 (Supp. 1954). See Preston v. Salem Improvement Co., 91
Va. 583, 22 S.E. 486 (1895).
113. Excluded from the present discussion are various summary procedures
applicable to particular types of litigation, e.g., landlord and tenant cases, or actions
brought against public officials. Also excluded is a consideration of various calendar
practices used to expedite particular classes of litigation. For a compilation of the
summary judgment procedures available in the various states, now somewhat outdated,
see Clark and Samenow, The Summary Judgment, 38 YALE L. J. 423 (1929). See also
VANDERBILT, MINIMUM STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 219-20 (1949).
For a discussion of the influence of English reformers in America, see Williamson,
Benthamn Looks at America, 70 POL. ScI. Q. 543 (1955) ; Dillon, supra note 4, at 507 n. 1;
Reppy, The Field Codification Concept, in FIELD CENTENARY ESSAYS 7, 18-21 (1949).
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cedure to satisfy them."' States adopting summary procedures limited
the remedy to stated types of cases in accordance with the English
model." 5 While these procedures were constantly amended to include
new types of cases, a completely unlimited summary judgment procedure
was unknown prior to the adoption of Federal Rule 56 in 1938.11 That
rule permits either the plaintiff or defendant to apply for summary judg-
ment in any type of case.' The availability of summary judgment is
not dependent upon the nature of the action, but rather upon the deter-
mination that no genuine issue of fact exists for trial."'
Thus Keating's Act reached its ultimate extension, not in England.,
but in the United States by the adoption of Federal Rule 56. Particularly
pertinent is the failure of the Evershed Committee to recommend a com-
pletely unrestricted summary judgment procedure. Cognizant of the
need for procedural reform to eliminate expense and delay in the courts
and to meet the growing competition of arbitration in the settlement of
commercial disputes," 9 the committee proposed to meet the problem by
strengthening the summons for directions, and by proposing a new sum-
mary procedure permitting a trial without pleadings. Thus the approach
to the problem of delay in England emphasizes the use of the alternative
114. Field, Report of the Specal Committee, 8 A.B.A. REP. 323, 334-35, 362 (1885).
David Dudley Field urged the adoption of the English summary judgment procedure in
cases involving bills of exchange and other obligations to pay a definite sum of money.
See Rodenback, The Reform of The Procedure in the Courts of the State of New
York, 34 N.Y. STATE BAR Ass'N REP. 354, 462 (1911). The New York Board of
Statutory Consolidation varied in its recommendation between a rule providing for
summary judgment generally and a rule providing for the procedure only in stated
cases as in the English practice. See Report of the Board of Statutory Consolidation
of the State of New York 14, Appendix 179 (1912) ; 1 id. at 23, 127, 212, 393 (1915)
5 id. at 89 (1919).
Judge Finch bluntly stated that summary judgment "is nothing but a process for the
prompt collection of debts. . . ." Finch, Summary Judgment Procedure, 17 AM. JUD.
Soc'y 180, 181 (1934). In urging the extension of the procedure to cases involving
mortgage foreclosures, judge Finch stated that "many lenders have been so delayed by
answers raising fictitious issues that they have resolved never again to lend money on
mortgage. This attitude, unless corrected, will go a long way toward hampering and
hurting those interested in the development of real estate." Finch, Exten-sion of the
Right of Summary Judgment, 4 N.Y. STATE BAR Ass'x BULL. 264, 266 (1932).
For an early indication that merchants were dissatisfied with pleading in the law
courts, see 7 HUNT, MERCHANTS' MAGAZINE 534 (1842) (pleading was "worse than
useless" and is often "the instrument of direct and palpable wrong").
115. See Clark and Samenow, supra note 113. The procedure adopted in some states
did permit defendants to avail themselves of the summary judgment procedure. See,
e.g., Rules 107, 108, 113, N.Y. Rules of Civil Practice.
116. Institute on Federal Rules, Washington, D. C. 179 (A.B.A. 1939); id. New
York, N.Y. 264; id., Cleveland, 295 (A.B.A. 1938).
117. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(a) and (b).
118. FED. R. CIv. P. 56(c).
119. Committee on Supreme Court Practice and Procedure, Final Report, par. 86-90,
at 31-32 (1953).
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and interrelated devices of specially indorsed writs, summary judgment,
trial without pleadings, and the summons for directions.' The reliance
on alternative procedures as well as the limitation on the scope of the
summary judgment procedure in England when compared with the rule
applying in the federal courts in the United States invites a consideration
and appraisal of the function and effect of summary judgment in expe-
diting and settling litigation.
III.
Summary procedures have been classified into two groups.' In the
first are those that do not vary appreciably from the ordinary procedure,
but expedite litigation by eliminating all formalities and by shortening
the time limitations for taking various procedural steps.'22 Implicit in
this type of procedure is the distinction between those procedural steps
considered essential and indispensable to a fair hearing and those that
are unnecessary and formalistic. 22 The famous Clernentiwt Saepe of
1306, in ordering causes to be heard "simplicitur et de plano" established
a summary procedure of this type.' Because it demonstrated that a
distinction could be made between necessary and ritualistic procedural
steps, it had an important influence on the development of procedure on
the continent. 1 25 In the second group are those procedures that vary
drastically from the ordinary ones. 2 ' The French executory procedure,
previously mentioned, was of this type since the defendant was precluded
from asserting any defenses except those particularly specified.2 7 Thus
the summary effect was obtained by arbitrarily limiting the scope of the
law suit itself.
The English summary judgment procedure does not fit this neat
scheme of classification. It neither eliminates formalities nor limits de-
fenses; instead its function is to determine at a pre-trial hearing whether
there is an adequate factual basis for the proposed plea of the defendant.
As previously noted, English procedure had developed no method of pre-
venting false pleading prior to this time, and the summary procedure was
designed to remedy that defect.' At the hearing of a motion for sum-
120. 98 SOL. J. 598 (1954) ; ODGERS, op. cit. supra note 78, at c. 17, at 243.
121. ENGLEMANN, op. cit. supra note 47, at 577-78.
122. Ibid.
123. Id. at 497.
124. Id. at 578, 494.
125. Id. at 497. See also, WEssEs, HISTORY OF ROMMA-DUTCH LAW 132, 143 (1908).
126. ENGLEmANN, op. cit. supra note 47, at 578.
127. See text at note 54 supra.
128. DAY, op. cit. supra note 5; Finch, Sumnmary Judgments under the Civil Prac-
tice Act in New York, 49 A.B.A. REP. 588, 590 (1924) ; Am. JuD. Soc'Y., Bull. XIV, at
99 (1919).
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mary judgment, the court decides whether a defense is genuine or ficti-
tious. Judgment will be ordered for plaintiff without trial if the defense
is found to be fictitious, but if the defendant succeeds in convincing the
court that a genuine defense to the action exists, a trial governed by the
ordinary procedure is held.' Thus the procedure is summary only be-
cause the court may order judgment for the plaintiff without the neces-
sity of a trial.
Several features of this procedure deserve attention. In the first
place, it is significant that the innovations affect only pre-trial procedure
and that no attempt has been made to alter the ordinary method of trial.
Traditionally the mode of trial in the common law courts was character-
ized by the oral testimony of the witness in open court, cross-examination
of that witness by the adverse party, and a resolution of the factual issues
by a verdict of the jury."' At just what point in English legal history
these characteristics became established, no one can say with certainty."'
Once established, however, the superiority of this system over that of the
civil law (derived from the canonical inquisition) was asserted by leading
commentators who considered the problem."'
The respect given to the ordinary trial procedure in England neces-
sarily limits the application of the summary judgment remedy to pre-
trial procedures. The reformers who drastically revised pre-trial pro-
cedures, liberalized or abolished rules of evidence, and even eliminated
the right to a jury trial in some cases, were unwilling to interfere with
the fundamental tenet of the common law trial that evidence is to be
129. ODGERS, op. cit. supra note 78, at 58-60; GREENBAU'M AND READE, op. cit. supra
note 83, at c. VII.
130. 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *373-*376.
131. THAYER, PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE 123 (1898). It is common
knowledge that the English institution of jury trial developed out of the Frankish inquest
(id. at 50), but the reason for the difference in the development of the inquest in France
and England has been called "one of the grand problems in the comparative history
of the two nations." 2 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, op. cit. supra note 49, at 604, n. 1.
Wigmore fixes the date of the establishment of the right of cross-examination at the
beginning of the 1700's. 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 8, at 237 (3d ed. 1940).
132. See Fortescue, De Laudibus Legun Anglie, c. XXVI, op. cit. supra note 1,
at 59; 3 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *379-*381; BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL
EVDENCE, Bk. II, c. IX and Bk. III, c. XX (1827). Cross-examination is the "greatest
legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth." 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1367, at
29 (3d ed. 1940).
The advantage of the English trial system over that which prevails in France where
the court is deprived of demeanor evidence, is described in 2 GARSONNET AND CZAR-BRu,
TRAITt DE PROCtDURE 588-89 (3d ed. 1912). The procis-verbal (the written statement
of the evidence) used in ordinary French trial procedure is termed "froid et incolore."
It is interesting to observe that the present Italian code of civil procedure now
makes provision for the examining judge to note anything in the demeanor of the witness
which might effect credibility. C. PR. C. 207, FRANCHI-FEROCI, QUATTRO CODICE (1946).
See Hammelmann, Rules of Evidence Under the New Italian, Codes, 29 J. COMp. LEG. &
INT'L LAW 39, 42 (3d series, Pts. III & IV, 1947).
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given by witnesses in open court subject to cross-examination.' Where
ordinary trial procedure is not accorded this high favor, it is to be ex-
pected that a summary procedure will assume quite a different form.
French trial procedure affords an interesting ilfustration. The ordinary
French trial procedure places great emphasis on documentary evidence.'
Even in cases where testimony by witnesses is admissible, no viva voce
evidence is presented in court during the trial of ordinary cases. In such
situations, an order is obtained for an inquest (enquore), and the witness
is summoned to appear before a judge-delegate authorized to conduct the
examination.' While the parties to the litigation are permitted to be
present at the inquest, they may not directly question the witness3 6 but
may only submit questions to the judge who actually conducts the inter-
133. For general discussions of English procedural reforms see Chorley, Procedural
Reform in England, in FIELD CENTENARY, ESSAYS 98 (1949) , JACKSON, THE MACHINERY
OF JUSTICE IN ENGLAND 55-68 (1940).
Cf. Royal Commission on the Despatch of Business at Common Law 1934-1936,
Final Report, par. 228, at 78 (1936). "English law starts from the general principle
that facts should be proved by a witness produced in court and subjected to cross-examina-
tion. Evidence by written declaration or affidavit is distrusted. We do not question the
soundness of this principle. On an impoitant point seriously disputed it is highly un-
satisfactory to be obliged to act on evidence which is not given in court and subjected
to cross-examination. But in most cases there are points which a judge could decide
with confidence on an affidavit, a certificate from a public body, company or officer,
or even on an unsworn declaration or a statement in a book of reputation." Id. at par.
229-34, at 78-79. The Commission recommended that the trial court be given discretion
to admit all documents that came into existence prior to the trial as well as affidavit
evidence, but in the latter case, the court could require the production of the deponent
for cross-examination.
The "new approach" of the Evershed Committee uses affidavits merely to define
issues, "leaving the claim and defence to be established by oral evidence at the trial."
Committee on Supreme Court Practice and Procedure, Final Report, par. 100, at 36
(1953). The Evershed Committee rejected as inappropriate the continental system of
trial (id. at par. 251, at 85-86) but, in an effort to reduce the cost of trials, endorsed
the use of documentary evidence in place of testimony of witnesses whenever possible.
Id. at par. 256, at 87. The recommendations of the Committee are summarized in par.
320, at 105-07.
134. C. Civ. 1341, CoDEs FRANVAIS USUELS (1952); Amos AND WALTON, INTRO-
DucTIoN TO FRENcH: LAW 347 (1935). Specifically excluded from article 1341 are com-
mercial matters, and article 1348 excepts, such obvious cases as torts, quasi-contracts,
and lost instruments. Article 1347 makes a further exception in cases where there is
a "beginning of written proof" (commencement de preuve par icrit). This refers to
situations where a party can produce a writing emanating from the party against whom
it is sought to be used which tends to establish the alleged fact as probable. The
strictness of the requirement of written proof has been mitigated still further by article
336 of the Code of Civil Procedure which now provides that in cases where a party has
been summoned for interrogation, and does not appear or refuses to answer questions
asked of him, it can be considered as equivalent to a beginning of proof under the
conditions of article 1347. For an enlightening collection of cases and authorities on
these problems, see VON MEHREN, MATERIALS ON COMNPARATIVE LAW, C-3-1 to C-3-3
(temp. ed. 1954).
135. C. PRO. 252-94.
136. C. PRO. 276.
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rogation.' 3 ' At the conclusion of the testimony, the judge-delegate directs
the preparation of a written deposition (proc~s verbal) which is sub-
mitted to the tribunal trying the case.'38 The court's decision will be
based on these written depositions and any pertinent documentary evi-
dence the parties may have submitted." 9
The notable feature of French summary procedure is that it elimi-
nates this cumbersome inquest procedure in cases where testimony of
witnesses is required. Though the examination of the witness retains
the name enquete, the testimony is given in open court before the judges
who are to decide the case. 4 ' The summary procedure also eliminates all
unnecessary pre-trial procedures including the necessity of resorting to
conciliation. 4' Thus its purpose is to free certain cases, because of their
importance, urgency, or simplicity, from the expense and delay of the
ordinary procedure.' 42 Because of the necessity for speed in the settle-
ment of commercial litigation, an even more expeditious procedure pre-
vails in the French commercial courts.'43 Pleadings are practically elimi-
nated,'4 the restriction on testimonial evidence is not applicable, 45 and
witnesses are examined in open court as in the summary procedure.'46
Both of these procedures obtain their "summary" effect merely by elimi-
nating all formalities that might impede the expeditious settlement of the
litigation.
137. C. PRo. 273.
138. CUCHE, PRtCIS DE PROCtDURE CIVILE ET CO'MMERCIALE 561 (Vincent ed. 9th
ed. 1946) ; Tyndale, The Organdsation and Administration of Justice in France, With an
Outline of French Procedure with Respect to the Production of Evidence, 13 CAN. B. REV.
655, 657-58 (1935).
139. Hamson, Civil Procedure in France and England, 10 CA.iB. L. J. 411, 417-18
(1950); 73 L. T. 395 (1882). Trial procedure in Italy is essentially the same as that
in France. See Sereni, Basic Features of Civil Procedure in Italy, 1 Am. J. Comp. LAW
373, 378-84 (1952).
140. 2 GARSONNET AND CZAR-BRu, op. cit. supra note 132, at 750-52; CUCHE, op.
cit. supra note 138, at par. 460, at 573-74, and par. 248, at 333-34.
141. 2 GARSONNET AND C]EZAR-BRU, op. cit. supra note 132, at 745.
142. 2 GARSONNET AND CtZAR-BRU, op. cit. supra note 132, at 741. See C. PRo.,
art. 404. The summary procedure is limited to appeals from justices of the peace,
uncontested suits, cases where the amount of money involved is small, and cases that
require urgent action.
143. 2 GARSONNET AND CZAR-BRU, op. cit. supra note 132, at 644. In France, the
commercial code governs enumerated acts of commerce. See C. COM., art. 632, 633;
Amtos & WALTON, op. cit. supra note 134, at c. XIV. Litigation involving these acts
of commerce is within the jurisdiction of the commercial courts. C. Com., art. 631.
144. C. PRO., art. 415-16. See 2 GARSONNET AND CZAR-BRU, op. cit. supra note
132, at 645-47.
145. C. Civ., art. 1341; C. Com., art 109, 2 GARSONNET AND CEZAR-BRu, op. Cit.
supra note 132, at 671.
146. C. PRo., art. 432. See 2 GARSONNET AND CfzAR-BRu, op. cit. supra note 132,
at 680-82.
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The method adopted in France to avoid delay focuses attention on
the second and salient characteristic of the English procedure. Though
operationally the summary judgment remedy is a pre-trial procedure and
has no effect on a trial if one is ordered, functionally its purpose is to
eliminate a trial in the absence of a proper showing by the defendant.
Nothing like this is attempted by the French summary procedure, which
preserves all essential procedural steps and contemplates a full hearing of
the case. Moreover, in the mandate-type summary procedure presently
authorized by German law for actions to recover liquidated sums or a
definite quantity of fungibles, defendant is similarly protected. 47 The
court's order of judgment for the plaintiff is conditioned on the failure
of the defendant to appear and defend."' 8 Once a defense is interposed,
it may be heard as in an ordinary proceeding. 49 In the European coun-
tries studied the only remaining vestige of the old executory procedure
which actually precluded defendant from asserting defenses to an action
is the practice relating to certain public or notarial documents evidencing
a liquidated demand. Upon default, in such cases, the holder of the docu-
ment is entitled to execution without any court action. 5 ' The validity of
the agreement embodied in such an instrument is presumed, and though
it is possible for the defendant to rebut the presumption of validity, such
actions are difficult and rare.'
147. There are two summary procedures in German law which are of interest.
The first is a special procedure called Urkunden ulnd Wechselprozess for the speedy
collection of checks and bills of exchange. Proof must be by documentary evidence
only, but if the defendant is unable to establish a defense by such evidence, a subsequent
hearing may be had in which every type of evidence is admissable. See 2 MANUAL OF
GERMAN LAW, par. 120-21, at 66-67 (Great Britain Foreign Office, 1952). The other
type of summary procedure called Mahnverfahren is available in cases where the plain-
tiff demaids a definite sum of money or a definite quantity of fungibles. Id. at par. 122,
at 67.
A similar summary procedure is found in the Italian law called procedinento
d'ingiunmzioix. This procedure is limited to liquidated claims for money, goods, or
fungibles provided that they are provable by documentary evidence. C. Pr. C. 633. Pro-
vision is made for the defendant to appear and defend. See ENGLEMANN, op. cit. supra
note 47, at 831-32.
148. 2 MANUAL OF GERMAN LAW, op. cit. supra note 147, at par. 123, at 57.
149. Ibid.
150. In France, the obligee obtains a copy of the notarial act known as a "grosse"
which means that it has the "forinule ixicutoire." See Amos AND WALTON, op. cit. supra
note 134, at 21; Smithers, The French Notariat, 3 PA. B. A. Q. 13 (1930) ; Smithers,
History of the French Notarial System, 60 U. OF PA. L. REv. 19, 32-33 (1911) and
A.B.A., ANNUAL BULLETIN, Comparative Law Bureau 15 (1912).
For a discussion of German law on this point, see Schlesinger, The Notary and the
Formal Contract in; Civil Law, Report, LAw REvISION COaM'N OF N.Y. 403, 413 (1941).
For a discussion of the notarial system in Italy, see Del Russo, The Notary Public
in the Civil Law of Italy, 20 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 524, 548-50; De-Besse, The Notarial
System in Italy, A.B.A., ANNUAL BULLETIN, Comparative Law Bureau 32, 40-42 (1912).
151. In France, the attack must be made in a special proceeding called inscription
de faux. In Germany, the attack may be made in an ordinary proceeding, but as a matter
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Because the function of the English summary judgment procedure
is limited to determining whether or not a trial is necessary, it involves
a problem of judgment that simply does not exist in the French and
German procedures. Those procedures afford defendant an opportunity
to appear and defend if he desires, but the English procedure is specifi-
cally designed to preclude a defendant from trial if he fails to show the
existence of a genuine defense at a pre-trial hearing of the plaintiff's
motion for judgment. If the defendant does establish that the case in-
volves material issues of fact, the court is prohibited from deciding them,
since such issues are to be resolved not on the basis of the affidavits
presented at the hearing but in an ordinary trial where the demeanor of
the witness may be observed and testimony may be subjected to cross-
examination. Obviously in a procedure of this type, the determination
of the existence of a genuine defense involves an exacting task of judg-
ment.
Because of the delicate nature of the decisional process in summary
judgment cases, the limited application of the procedure in England is
understandable. The remedy must be restricted to cases where the court
may safely determine even in the absence of demeanor evidence that
plaintiff is entitled to judgment without a trial. Recognizing this prob-
lem, Lord Brougham's original proposal in 1828 restricted the summary
procedure to cases where there was "a strong presumption of right" as
in actions on bills of exchange or bonds, and this limitation was incor-
porated into Keating's Act. The success of Keating's Act may be attri-
buted in large measure to the legal doctrine governing the type of case to
which it applied. The negotiable instrument has been described as a
"courier without luggage," because in order for the instrument to be
negotiable the obligation is severely circumscribed as to form. Moreover,
the proof of the plaintiff's case is aided by statutory presumptions,15 - and
the available defenses are limited by the substantive law.153 In actions on
negotiable instruments, when plaintiff establishes his claim by the pro-
duction of the instrument, and the defendant fails to attack its validity
or substantiate any other defense, the court is justified in ordering judg-
ment for the plaintiff.
When the procedure is extended to other debt collection situations,
more complex obligations and more extensive defenses are possible
than was the case with negotiable instruments. Nevertheless, the sum-
of practice, it is rarely successful. See authorities above and Schlesinger, sutpra note
150, at 413.
152. See, e.g., N.I.L. § 24 and § 59.
153. BRiTroN, BILLS AND NOTES, c. 4 (1943).
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mary procedure operates successfully in this area because many of these
transactions can be established by documentary' evidence that will be ac-
cepted by the court as valid when not impeached by controverting evidence
of the defendant.
Problems of the greatest complexity arise in the unlimited type
summary procedure introduced by Federal Rule 56, because in cases estab-
lished by testimonial proof, Anglo-American law, unlike the civil law,
has always attached the highest value to demeanor evidence and cross-
examination in determining the credibility of witnesses. Suppose the
plaintiff moves for summary judgment in an action to recover damages
resulting from a fradulent misrepresentation. Even in the absence of con-
troverting proof, granting the motion involves the favorable resolution
of issues of credibility raised by the testimonial evidence of the plain-
tiff's own witnesses. Since such evidence is ordinarily presented in the
form of affidavits or depositions at the hearing of the motion, the court
must reach its decision as to credibility without the benefit of demeanor
evidence and probably without the test of cross-examination. Never-
theless, the language of Federal Rule 56 clearly implies that the court has
at least some power to determine such questions of credibility.
Of course questions of credibility are also involved in cases estab-
lished by documentary evidence, since ordinarily the document must be
authenticated by witnesses.' While such cases are distinguishable from
cases established solely by testimonial evidence, 5 ' the basic question of
policy applies to all types of cases. That question is the extent of the
power of a court to determine issues' of credibility without the benefit of
demeanor evidence. The question is not avoided simply because Federal
Rule 56 fails to mention credibility, and instead states a test in terms of
the existence of a genuine issue of fact. Since questions of credibility
certainly can present issues of fact for trial, a court must determine which
questions of credibility do raise genuine factual issues that must be re-
served for trial. Moreover, the solution to the problem cannot be found in
the directed verdict test, because the judge in directing a verdict in an
ordinary trial does have the benefit of demeanor evidence.
In considering this question, the original evil that Keating's Act was
designed to remedy should be recalled. Debtors without any defense to
154. But cf. Asbill and Snell, Suvonary Judgment Under the Federal Rules
When an Issue of Fact is Presented, 51 MICH. L. REv. 1143, 1151-54 (1953). In England
if the liberal rules of evidence recommended by the Evershed Committee are adopted,
there may be no authenticating witnesses in some cases. See Committee on Supreme
Court Practice and Procedure, Final Report, par. 256, at 87 (1953).
155. See WIGWORE, THE SCIENCE OF JUDICIAL PROOF § 324, at 805 (3d ed. 1937);
3 BENTHAM, op. cit. supra note 132, at Bk. V, c. XV,. § IV (1827).
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an action on bills and notes pleaded falsely in order to delay their cred-
itors. It was rightly thought by the proponents of the reform that such
defendants would be reluctant to appear in court unless a defense could
be factually substantiated.15 6 This factor, in conjunction with the type
of obligation to which the procedure applied, explains the success of
Keating's Act. As the scope of the procedure was constantly expanded,
not only was it less likely that the motion would be uncontested, but also
the question of whether defendant was entitled to a trial becomes more
complex. Since the rules state no standard other than variations of the
vague formulation in Federal Rule 56 that the motion may be granted
if there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact," the court is ex-
pected to exercise the wisdom of Solomon to separate the sham from the
genuine issues of fact.'57
Finally, the burden imposed on trial courts by a summary procedure
of the type authorized by Federal Rule 56 is unique. The European pro-
cedures studied make no attempt to preclude the defendant from a trial,
but achieve their summary effect by eliminating pre-trial and trial formal-
ities. 5 The Virginia notice and motion practice has a similar objective,
and it is significant that the English are moving in this direction by the
"new approach" of the Evershed Committee. The committee drafting the
Federal Rules reduced pre-trial formalities, provided for pre-trial orders
to reduce expense and delay, and in addition, permitted the use of the
summary judgment procedure in all types of cases. The danger inherent
in this extension of summary judgment is that a court may deny a trial
to a litigant in a case involving real issues of fact. Because of the extreme
caution exercised by courts in the application of the rule, no doubt this
danger is seldom realized, but the use of the summary judgment pro-
cedure in cases where it is not appropriate does result in still more delay
156. See Brougham's argument in 131 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) 619 (1854) ; 137 PARL.
DEB. (3rd ser.) 1254 (1855) ; 53 LAW MAG. OR Q. REv. 77, 100-06 (1855). For statistics
indicating the extent of defaults in cases commenced by specially indorsed writs, see
Business of Court Committee, Interim Report, March 1933, X GREAT BRITAIn', HOUSE
OF COMMONS, SESSIONAL PAPERS, par. 18 (1932-1933).
157. Cf. Clark, The Summary Judgment, 36 MINN. L. REV. 567, 578-79 (1952).
"There is no desire to minimize the problem before the courts, trial as well as appel-
late. . . . What is needed is the application of common sense, good judgment, and
decisive action, on the one hand, not to shut a deserving litigant from his trial and,
on the other, not to allow harassment of an equally deserving suitor for immediate relief
by a long and worthless trial. Formulas or cliches will not help, and the announcement
of rolling precedents will only embarrass in the future."
158. This is obviously true of the French summary and commercial procedures.
Even if the defendant appears and defends in the German mandate procedure, "a con-
siderable amount of writing is rendered unnecessary ... " 2 MANUAL OF GERMAN
LAW, op. cit. supra note 147, at par. 124, at 68.
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in the disposition of litigation.'59 Thus a reform originally adopted to
eliminate delay may not only fail to reach its objective, but may actually
intensify the very condition it was meant to alleviate.
IV
The constant motivating force behind the development of the sum-
mary procedure was the demand of the commercial community for a rapid,
effective method of debt collection. In Europe, response to this demand re-
sulted in the institution of the executory procedure (in Italy) and the sub-
sequent development of modern mandate and documentary procedures.
Debt collection was just as important to the English merchant as to his con-
tinental brother. During the Middle Ages, secure in his own peculiar
law, the lea mercatoria, protected by his own courts applying a summary
procedure, and favored with the additional advantage of the system of
statutory recognizances, the English merchant happily exclaimed: "Let
me have the Staple Bill, and with one hundred nobles in my cash chest, I
can do business to the same amount as if I had a thousand."' 6 ° Later,
when the piepowder courts and the statutory recognizances fell into
disuse, and the law merchant was absorbed by the common law, that
"brevitie and expedition" required for the disposition of commercial
litigation was lost forever.'
Dissatisfaction with the delays and technicalities of the procedure in
the law courts eventually resulted in many reforms in judicial adminis-
tration, including the summary judgment procedure. The high regard of
the medieval merchant for the Staple Bill finds its counterpart in the
welcome the modern business community extended to the efficient method
of debt collection provided by the summary judgment procedure. The
adoption of a summary judgment procedure, stated a writer in the Corn-
inercial Law Journal, is "a justification for an increased expansion of
credits and a guarantee that liquid assets shall not ... be converted into
frozen assets.' 62
159. Cf. Clark, Summary Judgments, A Proposed Ride of Court, THE JUDICIAL
ADMINISTRATION MONOGRAPHS, Series A (collected) 19, 22 (1942). "Possible abuses
of the new practice do not seem to involve dangers of denial of the jury-trial right, as
was apparently feared originally. Indeed, as text writers have suggested, the courts
have been, if anything, overhesitant in granting the relief. . . . Dangers, if any, are
likely to be of a different nature and to involve not injustice, but conceivably waste
motion. If the procedure is resorted to regularly in cases where there is only a remote
possibility that the judgment will be granted, it is possible that a practice may develop
somewhat comparable to the old dilatory motions and demurrers which tended to delay,
rather than promote, adjudication."
160. 8 COLLECTED WORKS OF SIR R. PALGRAvE 255, as quoted in 49 SELDEN SocIETy,
supra note 13, at xiii.
161. 9 ENcYc. Soc. Sc. 270, 273 (1937).
162. Bush, Summary Judgments in California, 36 Com. L. J. 569 (1931).
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Although debt collection has always been a prominent factor in the
work of inferior courts, this in no sense minimizes the importance of
the summary judgment reform for courts of general jurisdiction. It is
apparent, however, that the summary judgment procedure is not adapted
to solving the problem of delay in the settlement of most commercial
litigation, for such disputes typically involve numerous and complicated
issues of fact. Recognizing that this is true, there remains a serious
question vf itherany reform of judicial administration will ever succeed
in placatihgIte business community. In observing that a growing volume
of commercial litigation was settled outside the law courts by arbitration,
the Peel Report in 1938 stated the reasons for this situation: "This pref-
erence of the commercial community for the settlement of their disputes
by arbitration is due, no doubt, to its greater freedom from appeals; its
informality privacy and friendly atmosphere; the saving of the great
expense of.'copying documents; and, above all, to the fact that the issue is
determined speedily and on a fixed date, arranged to suit the convenience
of the maximum number of the parties concerned in the dispute. ' 16 3
Accepting these reasons as valid, a businessman may still prefer arbi-
tration to a legal action even if all the suggested reforms in procedure
are adopted. Although the recommendations in the Evershed report
may result in less delay in the pre-trial stages of litigation, and calendar
practice and evidentiary rules may be reformed, the complete informality
and privacy of arbitration cannot be duplicated in a law court, and to
insure a "friendly atmosphere" in a court of law would require not a
reform but a miracle.
The effectiveness of an unlimited summary judgment procedure in
reducing delay in the disposition of litigation presents a serious question.
Basically, the problem involved is the formulation of a workable standard
for trial courts to apply in determining the existence of issues of
fact for trial. When the summary judgment procedure was narrowly
restricted to actions for liquidated debts, this need was minimized. The
extension of the procedure to new classes of cases intensifies the need
for a standard while at the same time the already difficult task of for-
mulating it is further complicated. Failure to articulate intelligible stand-
ards in jurisdictions where a completely unlimited summary judgment
procedure is permissible results in wasted judicial effort and added delay
to litigants in settling disputes, for vague standards inevitably lead to.
the utilization of the procedure in cases for which it is not suitable. In
addition such standards increase the danger of an erroneous decision
163. Royal Commission on the Despatch of Business at Common Law 1934-1936,
Final Report, par. 70, at 31 (1936).
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which will unfairly deprive a litigant of a common law trial. In the last
analysis, the contribution of the summary judgment procedure to the
solution of the problem of delay must be measured against the back-
ground of a working system of judicial procedure consisting of nu-
merous, interrelated rules. In reflecting on Federal Rule 56 in t61fi
context, one wonders if the words of Coleridge are not appropriate:
"Every reform, however necessary, will by weak minds be carried to
an excess, that itself will need reforming."
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